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I. INTRODUCTION
Several studies show that despite recent increases in the number of
minor conflicts, long-term trends suggest that international and civil
wars are declining.1 Analyzing the causes of the improvement in global
security since 1990, the 2006 Human Security Report argues that the
United Nations (UN) played a critically important role in spearheading a
huge upsurge of international conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and
peacebuilding activities.2 The evidence that these initiatives worked is
not just circumstantial. Contrary to popular perceptions, a recent RAND
Corporation study, for example, found that two-thirds of the UN’s
peacebuilding missions had succeeded.3 In addition, the sharp increase
in peacemaking efforts led to a significant increase in the number of
conflicts ending in negotiated settlements.4 The annual cost of the
charges to the international community has been modest—well under
1% of world military spending.5 The United States Government
Accountability Office estimated that it would cost the United States
approximately twice as much as the UN to conduct a peacekeeping
operation (PKO) similar to the UN stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH): an estimated $876 million compared to the UN
budgeted $428 million for the first fourteen months of the mission.6 In
fact, in 2006, the cost of running all of the UN’s nineteen PKOs around
the world for an entire year was less than the United States spent in Iraq

1. Human Security Brief 2006, Human Security Report Centre (2006), available at
http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2006/overview.aspx. See also Human Security
Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (2010), Human Security
Report Project, available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx
[hereinafter Human Security Report 2009/2010].
2. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, The Challenges of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil
War, in HOW TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE 39, 51 (Bjørn
Lomborg ed., 2006). See also Human Security Brief 2006, supra note 1, at ch. 3. The Human
Security Report 2009/2010 makes the same point and states that, while not suggesting that it is the
sole explanation, peacemaking and peacebuilding makes a difference. Human Security Report
2009/2010, supra note 1, at pt. I.
3. JAMES DOBBINS, A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 6
(2007) (including testimony presented before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight on June 13, 2007).
4. Id. at 7.
5. See
Financing
Peacekeeping,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/
financing.shtml; UN Peacekeeping Background Note, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
documents/backgroundnote.pdf. The approved peacekeeping budget for the period from July 2010
to June 2011 is approximately U.S. $7.3 billion. This represents about 0.5% of global military
spending, estimated at U.S. $1.531 trillion. Id.
6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-331, PEACEKEEPING:
COST
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL UN AND HYPOTHETICAL US OPERATIONS IN HAITI 7 (2006).
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at the height of the Iraq war in a single month.7 Despite the positive
changes, the RAND Corporation study makes it clear that there are no
grounds for complacency.8
Although the number of wars has decreased, far too many remain—
and there are still several places of instability around the globe that could
easily turn into conflict areas. Furthermore, because the underlying
causes of conflicts are too rarely addressed, the risks of new conflicts
breaking out in the same area and old ones starting up again remain very
real. This happened in Haiti where the UN is in its second peacekeeping
mission to the country.9 In terms of the challenge to establish enduring
peace in conflict zones, the Security Council has emphasized that “the
biggest deterrent to violent conflict is addressing the root causes of
conflict, including through the promotion of sustainable development
and a democratic society based on a strong rule of law and civic
institutions, including adherence to all human rights—civil, political,
economic, social and cultural.”10 One of the determinants of success,
therefore, of any peacekeeping mission is the extent to which it has the
capacity to address the root causes of a conflict in the host state of the
mission. In August 2000, a famous UN report, the Brahimi Report,
acknowledged the shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping efforts and
recommended wide-ranging reforms aimed at strengthening the
operations and making them more effective.11 Since then there have
been numerous other reports aimed at implementing reforms to
strengthen UN PKOs.12

7. Dobbins points out that the UN is a comparatively efficient and cost effective force
provider. In its specialized agencies, it possesses a broad panoply of civil as well as military
capabilities needed for nation building. DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 2. All missions UN missions are
planned, controlled, and sustained by a few hundred military and civilian staffers at UN
headquarters in New York. Id. Most troops come from Third World countries whose costs per
deployed soldier are a small fraction of any western army. Id. See also Richard Wolf, Afghan War
Costs Now Outpace Iraq’s, USA TODAY, May 13, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
military/2010-05-12-afghan_N.htm.
8. DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 8.
9. Ian Martin, Paper Versus Steel: The First Phase of the International Civilian Mission in
Haiti, in HONORING HUMAN RIGHTS AND KEEPING THE PEACE: LESSONS FROM EL SALVADOR,
CAMBODIA, AND HAITI 83 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 1995).
10. S.C. Res. 1327, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1327 (Nov. 13, 2000).
11. Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Rep., transmitted by identical letters dated Aug. 21, 2000
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000). The report is called the
Brahimi Report after its chairman of the committee which produced the report.
12. E.g. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/608 (Dec.
15, 2004).
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This Article builds on that report and discusses the broad
challenges facing UN peacekeeping missions today and the role of the
UN PKOs in the resolution of conflicts and in the reconstruction of post
conflicts states. The objective of the Article is to identify areas that need
attention to make peacekeeping missions more effective. The Article is
broken down into the following sections: (II) peacekeeping in theory
and practice; (III) the peacekeeping mandate; (IV) conditions and factors
that can help determine the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission;
and (IV) the broad challenges that face peacekeeping missions.
II. PEACEKEEPING: BACKGROUND, THEORY, AND PRACTICE
The UN was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order to “save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”13 Meeting this
challenge is the most important yardstick by which the organization is
judged by the people it exists to serve. One of the most important ways
in which the UN intervenes in conflicts and promotes peace is through
PKOs. Given the centrality of peacekeeping to UN peace initiatives, it is
somewhat surprising that no precise definition of peacekeeping can be
found in the UN Charter.14 It would appear, therefore, that the
“technique of peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United
Nations.”15 In all likelihood, this is the result of the fact that the
Charter’s authors “envisaged that threats to international peace and
security would primarily consist of aggression by one state against
another. . . . Peacekeeping was not envisaged as part of the
organization’s role, which lay primarily in establishing a system of
collective security.”16 Peacekeeping missions do not seem to fit within
the scope of the activities specified by chapter VI of the Charter, which
concerns the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” or chapter VII of the
Charter, which addresses “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.”17 As a practical matter,
when establishing a peacekeeping mission, the Security Council has

13. U.N. Charter preamble.
14. FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 717
(2d ed. 1993).
15. Brian Urquhart, The United Nations, Collective Security and International Peacekeeping,
in NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE ARTISANSHIP AND ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY
59, 62 (Alan K. Henrikson ed., Scholarly Res. 1986).
16. ALEX J. BELLAMY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING 46 (2004).
17. See U.N. Charter art. 33-51.
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usually invoked chapter VI of the UN Charter.18 Peacekeeping missions
are distinct from enforcement actions undertaken by the UN under
chapter VII of the Charter, as “[e]nforcement action is directed against a
state or other political entity, and has a coercive design. U.N.
peacekeeping, on the other hand, is not directed ‘against’ a particular
wrongdoer and traditionally has involved coercion only in a minimal
sense, if at all.”19 The Charter contains a tension between the doctrines
of national sovereignty and the protection and promotion of individual
rights and the promotion of peace and security generally in the context
of a civil war.20 Although the preamble of the Charter contains an
affirmation to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,”21 article
2(7) states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”22
PKOs have been a major activity of the UN almost since its
establishment in 1945. The UN has been involved in over sixty-three
peacekeeping missions since 1948.23 As the practice has evolved over
the years, a PKO has come to be defined as an operation involving
military personnel, but without enforcement powers undertaken by the
UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas
of conflict.24 These operations are voluntary and based on consent and
cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, the
peacekeeping missions achieve their objectives not by force of arms,
thus contrasting them with the enforcement action of the UN under
article 42 of the Charter.25 UN peacekeeping missions typically also
18. BRUCE R. PIRNIE & WILLIAM E. SIMONS, SOLDIERS FOR PEACE: CRITICAL OPERATIONAL
ISSUES xi (1996).
19. KIRGIS, supra note 14, at 716.
20. The Charter, in Chapter I, Article 2(7), guarantees sovereignty by providing that
“[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para
7. But in Article 13, the United Nations undertakes to promote human rights. Id. at art. 13, para 1.
21. Id. at preamble.
22. Id. at art. 2, para. 7.
23. United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/
statistics/factsheet.shtml.
24. A former UN Legal Counsel has defined peacekeeping operations as actions involving the
use of military personnel in international conflicts situations on the basis of the consent of all parties
concerned and without resorting to armed force except in cases of self defense. E. Suy, PeaceKeeping Operations, in A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (R.J. Dupuy ed., 1988).
25. Article 42 of the United Nations Charter provides for the Security Council to take
enforcement measures as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
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involve a large number of civilians and civilian police.26 UN
peacekeeping is a unique and dynamic mechanism developed by the UN
and is means to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for
lasting peace.27
The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when
the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military
observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement
between Israel and its Arab neighbors.28 Over the years, UN
peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and
a changing political landscape. During the Cold War, when cold war
rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping
goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing
situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political
level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.29 They operated under
UN command and were primarily mandated with the implementation of
activities agreed upon by warring factions, such as the cantonment and
separation of belligerents, the monitoring of borders, and the verification
of the ceasefire.30 With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context
for UN peacekeeping dramatically changed, prompting the UN
organization to shift and expand its field operations from “traditional
missions”
involving
strictly
military
tasks
to
complex
“multidimensional” enterprises designed to ensure the implementation of

Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of members of the United Nations. U.N. Charter art. 42.
26. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operation: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/62/627
(Dec. 28, 2007).
27. Dag Hammarskjld referred to peacekeeping as belonging to “Chapter VI and a half,”
which puts it between traditional methods of peaceful dispute resolution such as negotiation and
mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII. 60 Years
United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations Information Service, http://www.unis.unvienna.org/
pdf/60years_peacekeeping.pdf.
28. KIRGIS, supra note 14, at 720.
29. 60 Years of UN Peacekeeping, supra note 27; A History of Peacekeeping,
http://un.org/en/peacekeeping/ operations/surge.shtml.
30. See generally Larry M. Forster, Training Standards for United Nations Military
Observers: The Foundation of Excellence, 6 AFR. SECURITY REV. 4 (1997). Jakkie Cilliers and
Greg Mills observe, “Until the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was largely a matter of
upholding a peace already agreed to. After the fall of the Berlin Wall peacekeeping became more
ambitious as the international community sought to rebuild failed states and grapple with complex
emergencies.” See Jakkie Cilliers & Greg Mills, From Peacekeeping to Managing Complex
Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa, in FROM PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX
EMERGENCIES: PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA 2-3 (Jakkie Cilliers & Greg Mills eds., 1999).
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comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundation for
sustainable peace.31
The transformation of peacekeeping missions reflects in the UN’s
own words more than hybridization: “The goals of Peacekeeping
Missions have in fact changed significantly: from assisting in the
maintenance of ceasefires during cold war PKOs during the 1990s
increasingly becoming peacebuilding missions.”32 The broad and
complex mandates of today’s multidimensional peace operations reflect
the varied civilian, military, and police capabilities required to provide
support to the challenges of modern day peacekeeping. These include
tasks such as promoting political transitions, assisting in the
development of political structures, demobilization of armed forces, the
provision of humanitarian relief during emergencies to refugees and
internally displaced people, establishing the rule of law, promoting
security, supporting disarmament, holding elections, and jump-starting
the economy.33 As an example, the UN Operation in Mozambique
involved peacekeeping, the demobilization of armed forces, provision of
humanitarian aid, democratization, demining, the return of Mozambican
refugees that had fled to neighboring countries, and electoral support
which culminated in the 1994 general election which ushered in a post
conflict government.34 Other missions—including the UN Transition
Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the UN Observer Mission in
South Africa (UNOMSA) in South Africa, the UN Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the UN Observer Mission in El
Salvador (ONUSAL)—had huge electoral mandates that included
organizing elections and monitoring the electoral process.35 Indicative
31. 60 Years of UN Peacekeeping, supra note 27; A History of Peacekeeping, supra note 29.
32. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacebuilding: Lessons
from Recent Experience (Apr. 1999). In those days the UN were defenders of the status quo, and
operated with light arms under the strict instruction to use force only in self-defense.
33. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 26, ¶ 19. See also Peter H. Gantz, The Postconflict
Security Gap and the United Nations Peace Operations System, in SECURITY, RECONSTRUCTION,
AND RECONCILIATION: WHEN THE WARS END 247 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2007). In Mozambique “the
United Nations established a trust fund to help RENAMO transform itself from a military
movement into a political party.” UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995, at 4 (1995) [hereinafter THE UNITED NATIONS
AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995]. The UN argues that the “transformation of a guerrilla force,
experienced only in war, into a political entity with a stake in the democratic process, is one of the
most significant legacies of the United Nations operation” in Mozambique. Id.
34. THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995, supra note 33.
35. Jeff Fischer, Elections and International Civilian Policing: History and Practice in Peace
Operations, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SERVICES WHITE PAPERS (June 18,
2002). ONUMOZ was established by Security Council Resolution 799 in December 1992 to help
implement the general peace agreement signed on October 4, 1992 by the president of Mozambique
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of the change in strategy was a 1999 UN report which recommended that
“mandates should be conceptualized flexibly and could include elements
of peacebuilding and emergency reconstruction of war torn
economies.”36
In the early 1990s, the UN Security Council launched an
unprecedented number of PKOs.37 By the mid-1990s, political and
financial support for PKOs had waned, especially from the United States
after the failure of the United States-led (and UN-sanctioned) mission in
Somalia in 1992 and 1993.38 Support from troop-contributing countries
shriveled as the UN fell behind in its payments and military challenges
in civil war situations mounted.39
Despite the supposed broad array of conflict management
techniques, international attention remains fixed on “peacekeeping” or
the utility of multinational interventions as an essential element in the
amelioration or resolution of armed conflict. The frustrating aspect of
the approach is that even as the perceived demand for peacekeeping has
increased, the capacity of the UN to deliver peacekeepers seems to have
diminished.40 This is largely because of the huge cost implications of
PKOs. The two UN missions in Southern Sudan and Darfur faced many
difficulties in deployment, coordination, and making the missions

and the president of the Resistancia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO). UNTAG was established
in accordance with Resolution 632 of February 1989 to assist the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under
the supervision and control of the UN. ONUSAL was established on May 20, 1991 by Security
Council Resolution 1991. Its mandate was to verify the implementation of all agreements between
the government of El Salvador and Frente Farbundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional aimed at
ending a decade long civil war. UNTAC was established by Security Council Resolution 745 of
February 28, 1992 to ensure the implementation of the Agreement of a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict signed in Paris on October 23, 1991. UNOMSA was
established by Security Council Resolution 772 in 1992 and 1994 to assist the people of South
Africa in their transition from apartheid South Africa to a non-racial democratic society. Id.
36. Rep. of the Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons
from Recent Experience (1999).
37. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 620 (David
M. Malone ed., 2004). Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills observed that “the early 1990s were the high
water mark in the euphoria of the post-cold war era of peacekeeping. While 13 operations were
established in the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping, 36 new operations have been launched since
1988.” Cilliers & Mills, supra note 30, at 1.
38. ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE AND
GUINEA-BISSAU 16 (2002).
39. DOBBINS , supra note 3, at 3.
40. Rep. of the Special Comm. On Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly,
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶¶
7-8, U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000).
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operational.41 The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was set up by the
UN Security Council in March 2005.42 Its mandate was to support the
implementation of the Southern Sudan Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.43 The African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID), an AU/UN hybrid operation and one of the largest UN
missions ever, was established by the Security Council in July 2007 to
bolster the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur which had been
Its mission is to oversee the
operating there since 2004.44
implementation of Darfur peace agreements and to protect civilians.45
The first mission deployed in Sudan under the leadership of the AU
faced enormous challenges with equipment, which negatively impacted
their effectiveness. Soon after the AU deployed forces, rebels drove into
an AU base in eastern Darfur, stole technical equipment and weapons,
and killed ten Nigerian peacekeepers.46 Poorly equipped and outfitted,
the AU soldiers did not have a chance. They could not defend
themselves adequately nor could they hunt their attackers; the
peacekeepers did not have helicopters to do that. The deployment
situation has since improved, as the mission was transformed into a
UN/AU hybrid mission but peacekeeping efforts have been limited as
the mission lacks a peace agreement to implement.47 The mission
remains a peacekeeping mission in the midst of ongoing conflict. The
demands of UN peacekeeping will always test the will of the
international community to promote peace and security in the world’s
conflict areas. Despite widespread recognition that, in order to be
effective, UN peacekeeping needs the concrete contributions of the
member states in the form of personnel, finances, and political support,

41. Centre for Conflict Resolution, Stabilizing Sudan: Domestic, Sub-Regional and ExtraRegional Challenges 3 (2010).
42. S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005).
43. The 10,000 strong UN mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), which was launched to support the
implementation of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the
Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army, faced many challenges. DANIEL LARGE & CHRIS SAUNDERS, STABILIZING
SUDAN: DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES 7 (2010).
44. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
45. On July 31, 2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1769 authorizing
the deployment of a 26,000 strong United Nations-African Union force to help implement peace
agreements. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007). In part 15(a)(ii), the
resolution invoked Chapter 7 to authorize UNAMID’s use of force to protect civilians. Id. at ¶ 15.
46. Alexander Schwabe, Failure Looms for Darfur Peacekeepers, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Nov. 23,
2007, http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,5193330,00.html.
47. Center for Conflict Resolution, Stabilizing Sudan: Domestic, Sub-Regional, and ExtraRegional Challenges 8 (2010).
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the international community invariably fails to meet the needs of
PKOs.48
As the UN peacekeeping enterprise declined after the Somalia
failure, the United States started to promote “regional” approaches to
peacekeeping, particularly through NATO.49 The Clinton administration
deployed United States military personnel to Kosovo, first as part of a
NATO air operation to force the withdrawal of Yugoslavia troops from
Kosovo, and next as part of a NATO peacekeeping force.50 But after the
war in Kosovo in spring of 1999, broad opposition to unilateral
peacekeeping led to a revival of the UN variety of peacekeeping.51
Major new UN PKO (PKO) missions in East Timor,52 Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Ivory Coast, and the Congo brought another surge in
international peacekeeping.53 Today there are almost 124,000 personnel
serving hundreds of millions of people around the world.54 There are a
total of sixteen peacekeeping missions in place, including seven in
Africa, one in the Americas, two in Asia, three in Europe, and three in
the Middle East.
This represents a nine-fold increase in UN
peacekeeping since 1999.55
There can be no dispute that UN peacekeeping missions have had
mixed results. There have been successes and failures. Mozambique,
Cambodia, and East Timor are examples of successful transitions from
conflict to stable states. A troubling aspect is that there have been cases
where second missions have been necessary, such as in Liberia and
Haiti.56 It is important, therefore, to examine the problems faced by
48. Schwabe, supra note 46.
49. Sarah B. Sewall, U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations (Carr
Ctr for Human Rights Pol’y, Working Paper 01-3, 2000).
50. In the Balkans, the intervention in Kosovo was a NATO mission.
51. Richard Falk, Legality to Legitimacy: the Revival of the Just War Framework, HARV.
INT’L REV., May 6, 2006, http://hir.harvard.edu/interventionism/legality-to-legitimacy.
52. The United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) was established on June 11, 1999
and ended on October 25, 1999. East Timor—UNMISET—Background, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/background.html.
A second mission, United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), was established to administer the territory.
Id. At independence UNTAET was succeeded by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET), established by Security Council Resolution 1410 of May 17, 2002 to provide
assistance to core administrative structures critical to the validity and political stability in East
Timor. S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002).
53. Both Liberia and Haiti have had repeat missions. See Charles Arthur, Building Peace in
Haiti, 4 U.N. Chronicle 69 (2000-2001); ADEBAJO, supra note 38, at 43.
54. UN Peacekeeping Background Note, http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/
2010/factsheet.pdf.
55. Id.
56. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992)
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peacekeeping missions and consider how best to organize them to
effectively promote peace and development to troubled parts of the
world.
Given the potentially unlimited scope of activities that can be
encompassed by the term “peacekeeping mission,” it is useful to
examine the categories of missions periodically undertaken by the UN.
There are two policy documents that define the nature of PKOs: An
Agenda for Peace57 and the Brahimi Report.58 Peacekeeping has
evolved rapidly in the past decade from the traditional, primarily
military model of observing ceasefires and forcing separation fighting
forces or parties after interstate wars, to incorporate a complex model of
many elements, military and civilian working together to build peace in
the dangerous aftermath of civil wars. Boutouros-Boutorous Ghali, in
his An Agenda for Peace, outlines five types of missions: (1) preventive
diplomacy; (2) peace making; (3) peacekeeping; (4) peace enforcement;
and (5) peacebuilding.59
A.

Preventive Diplomacy

Through preventive diplomacy, the UN seeks to remove the sources
of danger before violence erupts. This means taking actions that are
aimed at easing tensions before they result in conflict. It also means
early warning of impending conflicts based on information gathering
and fact finding. It is clear that early warning systems are not working
as effectively as they should; otherwise, such tragic situations as Darfur
could have been foreseen (and prevented). Rather, it seems that civil
society (non-governmental organizations and the media) often do a
better job than the UN system. Indeed, it was the nongovernmental
[hereinafter An Agenda for Peace]. After the Economic Community of Western African States
(ECOWAS) brokered a peace agreement in 1993, the Security Council established the United
Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) by Resolution 866 in 1993. The mission was
completed in 1997. The war resumed. After a peace agreement, the United Nations Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 1509 in 2003. The United
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established by Resolution 867 in 1993. The crisis resumed
in 2004 and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was established by
Resolution 1542 in 2004. Id.
57. Id.
58. Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809 (2000).
This report is commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report after its chairman Lakhdar Brahimi. The
report was published in response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s request that the panel
review UN peacekeeping operations and make recommendations to assist the United Nations in
conducting such activities better in the future. It is regarded as one of the key documents on
peacekeeping in the UN. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
59. See An Agenda for Peace, supra note 56.
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organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch that first warned the world
about Darfur.60 To effectively provide early warning, the UN would
need (improved) capacity in both information gathering and analysis of
information.
However, it bears noting that, even when information has been
available, responses to outbreaks of conflict have been slow, often
hobbled by conflicting foreign policy interests of Security Council
members and the reluctance of states to incur the human, material, and
financial cost of UN intervention.61 Perhaps the clearest and most cited
example of this is the failure to act in Rwanda. It is well known that the
UN Force Commander in Rwanda, General Dallaire, on January 11,
1994, wrote to then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan informing him of
information received indicating that Hutu extremists were preparing to
exterminate Tutsis and that major arms caches could be identified by the
informant. General Daillaire stated that his forces were prepared to act.
Annan’s response was that Dallaire was not to confront the extremist, as
that was not within his mandate.62 Thus, capacity to provide early
warning may be rendered moot if not met with the willingness to act
upon such information—and prevent or at least mitigate the warnedabout crises.
B.

Peace Making

Peace making falls between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict
and keeping the peace; it involves efforts to bring hostile parties to
agreement by peaceful means. Peace making addresses conflicts in
progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy
and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of governments, groups of
states, regional organizations, or the UN; peacemakers may likewise be
unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case in
Mozambique, where negotiations leading to a peace accord were led by
a team of four non-UN personnel.63 Peace making may even be the
60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 16 DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT
MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN 6(A) (May 6, 2004). The report is an extensive and
detailed documentation of the killing of thousands of people by the Government and militias allied
to it. The report accused the Sudanese Government of being responsible for ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.
61. DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 9. An example is the delayed response to the Rwanda genocide
in 1994. See generally ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF
HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004).
62. DALLAIRE, supra note 61, at 142-46.
63. Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and Liberation Front of Mozambique
(FRELIMO) “agreed on four individual mediators, representing the Italian Government, (Mr. Mario
AND
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work of a prominent personality, working independent of or with the
UN, such as George Mitchell, Jr.’s work in Northern Ireland or Kofi
Annan’s work in Kenya. More specifically, as a United States Special
Envoy to Northern Ireland, George Mitchell, Jr. chaired all party
negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.64 For his
part, Kofi Annan chaired the Panel of Eminent African Personalities,
which led the peace process following Kenya’s post-election violence in
2007,65 bringing about a peace agreement after the country was at the
brink of collapse.66
C.

Peacekeeping

At another level, peacekeeping is when conflict has broken out and
the UN intervenes in order to assist in keeping peace; such initiatives
aim to create space for the parties to negotiate a settlement. Examples
include peacekeeping missions in South Africa, Haiti, Liberia, Balkans,
and East Timor.67 Typically, the UN deploys a large force to keep the
parties apart and enforce whatever peace accords to which the parties
agree. In most cases, in the interest of speed, the UN allows an
international force or a country to act on its behalf before it deploys. For
example, in East Timor and Haiti, the UN allowed the Australian
government and the United States government, respectively, to deploy
troops before the UN deployed.68 Such an approach is more time
efficient, given that the UN does not have a standing army, and it
therefore always takes a while before it can assemble and deploy a
peacekeeping force. Notably, the speed at which deployment proceeds

Raffaelli), the Sant’ Egidio Community, (Professor Andrea Riccardi and Don MatteoZuppi) and
Mozambique’s Episcopal Conference (Archbishop Jaime Goncalves).” THE UNITED NATIONS AND
MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995, supra note 33, at 16.
64. ELISABETH LINDENMAYER & JOSIE LIANNA KAYE, A CHOICE FOR PEACE?: THE STORY
OF FORTY-ONE DAYS OF MEDIATION IN KENYA 1 (Aug. 2009).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See S.C. Res. 772, U.N. Doc. S/RES/772 (Aug. 17, 1992) (United Nations Observer
Mission in South Africa); S.C. Res. 1542, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004) (United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti); S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003) (United
Nations Mission in Liberia); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo); and S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272
(Oct. 25, 1999) (United Nations Mission in East Timor).
68. United Nations Foundation, Keeping the Peace: A Brief Guide to UN Peacekeeping, UNF
Insight: New Ideas for International Cooperation.
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depends entirely on troop contributions from member states and the
timely availability of resources to finance the mission.69
D.

Peace Enforcement

This constitutes a type of military activity that, while coercive in
nature, remains distinct from war. The concept of peace enforcement
rests on the premise that force is being used to enforce a mandate. An
example would be the use of force in Sierra Leone to make the rebels
abide by the peace agreements they had signed. It is also found in
country doctrines. According to the United Kingdom military doctrine,
peace enforcement initiatives are neither in support of nor against a
particular party, but are designed to restore peace and ensure compliance
with the mandate in an evenhanded manner.70 The problem with peace
enforcement is always going to be how to ensure that the use of force
will not influence the political dynamics of the conflict. The side against
whom the enforcement is being carried out is likely to view the UN
peacekeepers as enemies. Accordingly, a UN report encourages caution
in the use of the peace enforcement option, warning that it “was
impossible to stop a war by spreading it.”71 The solution is to expect the
Force Commander to excise good judgment as to when an enforcement
measure would be appropriate.
E.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a term of more recent origin that defines activities
undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of
peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something
that is more than just the absence of war.72 This occurs after both a
ceasefire and a political settlement have been reached. In other words,
in these cases, the parties have already agreed upon their solution to the
conflict. These types of operations incorporate a substantial number of
civilians alongside the military component. Thus peacebuilding is not
limited to demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants into civilian
69. New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 70-77 (2009) (testimony of Erin A. Weir).
70. See MINISTRY OF DEF, JWP 3-50, THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS (2d ed. June 2004).
71. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly,
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶
20 U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000).
72. Rep.
of
the
Panel
on
U.N.
Peace
Operations,
¶
13,
www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/.
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society; peacebuilding also includes building institutions of governance,
building a civil service and the judiciary, and strengthening the rule of
law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police and
judicial and penal reform). Peacebuilding further includes improving
respect for human rights through the monitoring of, education on, and
investigation of past and existing abuses and providing technical
assistance for democratic transition (including electoral assistance and
support for the development of free media and civil society, as well as
promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques).
In
Somalia, the Security Council, in March 1993, envisaged a role for
UNOSOM II that involved far more than simply the continuation of the
first mission which was charged with securing an environment for
humanitarian assistance.73 Indeed, Boutros Ghali called for a mandate
that “would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the
Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and
political life, re-establishing, and recreating a Somali state based on
democratic governance and rehabilitating the country’s economy and
infrastructure.”74 Another example is East Timor. On October 25, 1999,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1271, establishing the UN
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), with overall
legislative and executive authority, including the administration of
justice.75 The Resolution included provisions to provide security and
maintain law and order; establish an effective administration; assist in
the development of civil and social services; ensure the coordination and
delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development
assistance; support capacity building for self-government; and assist in
the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.76
The UN has created the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),77 the
Peacebuilding Fund (PBF),78 and the Peacebuilding Support Office
(PBSO)79 to address the needs of peacebuilding in countries emerging
73. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 58, 101, U.N. Doc. S/25354
(Mar. 3, 1993).
74. Id.
75. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
76. Id. ¶ 2.
77. The Peacebuilding Commission was established in 2006 through General Assembly
Resolution A/60/180 and Security Council Resolution S/RES/1645-2005. S.C. Res. 1645, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). It has already funded over 115 projects in fifteen countries. It is
managed on behalf of the Secretary-General by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding
Support Office. The UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office) is the PPF Fund
Administrator.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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from conflict. These institutions form a key addition to the capacity of
the international community in terms of a broader peace agenda. The
PBC brings together all the relevant actors (including international
donors, international financial institutions, national governments, and
troop-contributing countries); marshals resources; advises on and
proposes integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and
recovery; and, where appropriate, highlights gaps that threaten to
undermine peace.80 The mandate of the PBC is comprised of three
objectives:
(1) to promote post-conflict peacebuilding through
mobilizing relevant actors both within and outside the UN and to devise
strategies and identify the resources necessary for the promotion of postconflict reconstruction; (2) to help bridge the gap between the immediate
post-conflict phase and sustainable peace through the identification of
relevant public institutions to support recovery and economic
development; and (3) to provide a monitoring and review function to
facilitate information sharing among all parties concerned.81 The
Commission funds projects and helps in building institutions that
promote economic development and good governance. The PBC has
four criteria for funding projects: (1) respond to imminent threats to
peace processes and initiatives that support peace agreements and
political dialogue; (2) build national capacities to promote coexistence
and peaceful resolution of conflict; (3) stimulate economic revitalization
to generate peace dividends; and (4) establish essential administrative
services.82
III. THE MANDATE AND THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION
In any peacekeeping mission the mandate serves as the constitution
of the operation. A peacekeeping83 mandate informs a PKO. Although
scholars and practitioners use the term “mandate” in different ways, for
the purposes of this article, “mandate” refers to the broad objectives and
specific instructions that define, limit, and guide a PKO. Although it
varies by PKO, there is generally not one document that provides the
complete mandate of a PKO. Instead, the mandate is found in Security

80. S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping in his Agenda for Peace as “the deployment
of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of the parties, normally involving UN
military and/or police and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.” An Agenda for Peace,
supra note 56, ¶ 20.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/5

16

Ndulo: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

10-NDULO_44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOCX

2011]

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

8/15/2011 2:16 PM

785

Council resolutions, the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security
Council, and relevant peace agreements relating to the mission. What
peacekeepers are authorized, obligated, inclined, and equipped to do is,
in large part, determined by these documents. In fact, much of what is
known by the public about peacekeeping mandates is how little a given
mandate has authorized the peacekeepers to use force and equipped them
to protect civilians. We can all remember how peacekeepers in Rwanda
cried desperately for a more robust peacekeeping mandate that would
allow them to use force defensively as well as offensively to carry out
their tasks as outlined in the mandate. Recall the story of General
Derille, the Canadian Force commander in Rwanda, and his famous fax
to UN headquarters.84
One of the weaknesses of the process of developing a mandate is
that many of the actors involved in the creation and development of the
mandate are not acquainted with how other actors involved in the same
process operate. This is partly due to the fact that the process behind the
creation of a mandate is often ad hoc, disjointed, and unpredictable. The
key actors are the Security Council members and the donor states that
are responsible for the funding of the mandate. A typical UN mandate
contains the following elements: a background to the situation being
addressed, the objective of the mission, the powers of the mission, the
tasks to be implemented, the rules of engagement, and sometimes the
mechanisms to be used to implement the mandate. For example,
Resolution 772, which in 1992 set up the UN Observer Mission in South
Africa (UNOMSA), called upon UNOMSA “to strengthen and reinforce
the indigenous mechanisms set up under the National Peace Accords, so
as to enhance their capacity in the building of peace, both in the present
and in the future,”85 and Resolution 1769 setting up the UN African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) invokes Chapter 7 of the UN
Charter to authorize UNAMID’s use of force to protect civilians.86
Developing a mandate is an inherently political process. Often,
Security Council members receive instructions from their capitals and
make rigid proposals with little flexibility. The process is not inclusive
of other member states of the UN who are given no avenues to influence

84. DALLAIRE, supra note 61, at xii. General Dallaire served as UN force commander in
Rwanda during 1993-1994. Id. He sent the famous fax to UN headquarters informing the UN that
he had come across military cashes and asked to take them over where upon he was informed that it
was not in his mandate. Id.
85. S.C. Res. 772, U.N. Doc. S/RES/772 (Aug. 17, 1992).
86. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
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the process.87 Importantly, mandates are both legal and political in
nature. As such, while the language employed by the mandate drafters
can have legal consequences, the rationale behind this language is
almost completely politically driven. The drafting of a mandate involves
many actors, ranging from Security Council members to the warring
factions of the host country88 to officers from the UN political and
peacekeeping departments. Mandates are a result of consensus among
the parties involved in its development—which parties are not
necessarily directly involved in the conflict. Mandates’ objectives range
from assisting in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement to
preventing an outbreak of conflict and delivering humanitarian relief
supplies, to administering a territory for a transitional period and
conducting elections.89
The mandate of a PKO must be distinguished from the legal basis
regulating the implementation of the mandate. The legal framework is
founded on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that is concluded
between the UN and host state.90 Among other things, the SOFA allows
the establishment of the mission; importation of equipment and flying
rights; and incorporates the privileges and immunities of the
peacekeepers which define the legal limits that peacekeepers are bound
to when implementing a mandate’s broad objectives and specific
instructions. For example, while a mandate will include a request for
ceasefire verification, the legal framework will ensure operational needs
of the mission and that, unless the UN waves immunity, in the event any
peacekeeper commits a crime during such the duration of the mission, he
or she will not be subject to the host state’s legal systems.91 The SOFA
sets specific terms for the conduct, privileges, immunities, and
jurisdictions of the military and civilian employees on matters such as
criminal and civil jurisdiction.92 SOFAs provide for immunity for
peacekeepers from local jurisdictions and establish exclusive jurisdiction
87. ELLIE B. HEARNE, INT’L PEACE INST., FROM NEW YORK TO THE FIELD: A DIALOGUE ON
U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS 6 (2010).
88. Id.
89. See RAY MURPHY, U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON, SOMALIA AND KOSOVO:
OPERATIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN PRACTICE 17 (2007).
90. U.N. DEPT. OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES UNIT,
HANDBOOK ON UNITED NATIONS: MULTDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 13 (2003)
91. See Muna Ndulo, The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of
Women and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 126
(2009).
92. See Press Release, Security Council, Secretary-General Says Signing of Status of Forces
Agreement “Positive Step Forward” in effort to Deploy Darfur Mission, U.N Press Release
SG/SM/11414, AFR/165, PKO/176 (Feb. 14, 2008).
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of the troop-contributing peacekeepers’ nation of origin.93 These are
important norms without which peacekeeping missions could not operate
effectively. Host states could easily frustrate the work of missions by
subjecting them to sham prosecutions and harassment to impede their
work.
Immunities for UN workers are grounded in articles 104 and 105 of
the UN Charter. These articles provide that the UN and its staff enjoy
such privileges and immunities in territories of member states as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their function.94 They give
immunity to the UN and its employees, including peacekeepers, when
operating in foreign territory.95 While the founders of the UN did not
intend that the privileges and immunities of officials should constitute a
shield from national criminal prosecution for crimes committed in a state
hosting the UN operation where crimes have clearly been committed, the
International Court of Justice has held that personnel employed directly
by the UN on mission receive functional immunity from prosecution for
acts committed while executing their duties.96
It bears noting that, while the SOFA guarantees the legality of the
peacekeepers’ conduct on the territory of a sovereign country and
outlines the conditions under which the force shall operate in the host
state,97 the Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide the armed forces the
authority for the use of force, delineating the circumstances and
limitations under which the peacekeepers may initiate or continue
combat engagement when encountering other forces.98
The elaboration of a mandate relies on the Secretary-General’s
report of the situation in the host state. Typically, prior to the conclusion
of the preparation of the report the Secretary-General sends a special
envoy to the area to get first-hand information about the situation on the
ground. For example, in the case of UNOMSA following South Africa’s
Baipatong massacres on June 17, 1992, the Security Council
unanimously adopted (on July 16, 1992) Resolution 765 by which it,

93. See Ndulo, supra note 91, at 153.
94. U.N. Charter art. 104-105; see also B. SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 1302 (2002).
95. See MURPHY, supra note 89, at 111.
96. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of United Nations (The Mazilu Case), 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 177, 29 ILM 98 (Dec. 15, 1989).
97. See MURPHY, supra note 89, at 109; see also M. R. KOCHHAR, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING AND OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 30 (2000).
98. See James Burger, Legal Issues in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, in 7 INT’L
PEACEKEEPING YEARBOOK 425, 431-33 (Michael Bothe & Boris Kondoch eds., 2001); JOINT
DOCTRINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, J-1-02.
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inter alia, invited the Secretary-General to appoint a Special
Representative for South Africa to recommend—after discussion with
the parties in the country—measures which would assist in bringing an
effective end to the violence and in creating conditions for negotiations
leading to a peaceful transition to a democratic, non-racial, and united
South Africa.99 The Secretary-General appointed Cyrus R. Vance as his
special representative to South Africa. Following Vance’s report, the
Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council, which led
to the adoption of Resolution 772 on August 17, 1992. Resolution 772
formed the mandate of UNOMSA.100
Perhaps not surprisingly, the degree of reliance placed on the
Secretary-General’s report by the Security Council will depend on the
nature and clarity of the report. That is, a report that describes the
situation on the ground and frames the issues but does not suggest
approaches to addressing these issues will be helpful for the drafting of
the mandate but will not become the actual mandate. It stands to reason
that the most useful Secretary-General reports are those that clearly
identify the issues and suggest solutions. However, some reports—even
those that present issues and solutions—may not become part of the
mandate because the Security Council members’ resources and interests
do not coincide with the requests or suggestions made by the SecretaryGeneral in the report.
After the adoption of the mandate, the Secretary-General sends one
or more Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) to develop a concept of
operations for the mission, assess the situation on the ground, and
determine the local dynamics of the situation.101 Typically, a small
TAM is sent before the mandate is finalized to assess the financial and
technical implications of deploying mission and a more fully-fledged
TAM is sent after the adoption of the mandate.102 TAMs will generally
include representatives from the DPKO and the Department of Field

99. S.C. Res. 765, ¶ 4 U.N. Doc. S/RES/765 (July 16, 1992).
100. Final Rep. of the U.N. Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the U.N.
Secretary-General (May 26, 1994). See also S.C. Res. 772, U.N. Doc. S/RES/772 (Aug. 17, 1992).
101. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, Forming a New Operation,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/newwoeration.shtml [hereinafter Forming a New
Operation]. See also Technical Assessment Mission Guidelines, http://www.unddr.org/tool_
docs/DDR-technical-assessment_mission_guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Technical Assessment
Mission Guidelines].
102. See Forming a New Operation, supra note 101. See also Technical Assessment Mission
Guidelines, supra note 101.
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Support (DFS).103 The representatives of the DPKO may include,
depending on the purpose of the TAM: the Office of Operations, the
Office of Military Affairs, and the Office of Rule of Law and Security
Institutions (including the Police Division, the DDR Section, and the
Mine Action Service).104 Increasingly, TAMs include representatives of
other UN agencies, such as the UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA, OHCHR,
UNHCR and UNAIDS.105 While in the country, the TAM meets with all
stakeholders, including NGOs.
As was noted previously, many peace agreements form the basis of
the peacekeeping mandate such that either the mandate includes
provisions of the peace agreement or the mandate provides for the
implementation of the peace agreement. In those situations, the UN
(through the PKO) has as its mandate the implementation of the peace
agreement, such as was the case in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Afghanistan.106
An issue that often arises in both developing the mandate and in
PKOs is the extent to which the UN can use neighboring countries as
partners in both processes. The use of neighbors has its advantages. As
Mark Malan points out “neighbors are more familiar with each other’s
problems than outsiders. Neighbors usually have a fairly common
culture, a common social identity, a common history and
experiences.”107 In the Namibian peace process, neighboring states—the
“frontline states” as they called themselves—played a significant role in
facilitating the agreement that became the basis of the Namibian peace
process.108 In 1977, a pressure group, the Western Contact Group, was
formed and included Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.109 The group launched a joint diplomatic effort to
bring an internationally acceptable transition to independence for

103. See See Forming a New Operation, supra note 101. See also Technical Assessment
Mission Guidelines, supra note 101.
104. See See Forming a New Operation, supra note 101. See also Technical Assessment
Mission Guidelines, supra note 101.
105. See See Forming a New Operation, supra note 101. See also Technical Assessment
Mission Guidelines, supra note 101.
106. S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003); S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999).
107. Mark Malan, Debunking Some Myths About Peacekeeping in Africa, in FROM
PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES: PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA, supra note 30,
at 15.
108. See
Namibia-UNTAG
Background,
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htm.
109. Id.
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Namibia.110 The Western Contact Group’s efforts led to the presentation
in 1978 of Security Council Resolution 435 for settling the Namibian
problem.111 The settlement proposal, as it became known, was worked
out after lengthy consultation with South Africa and the Frontline States
(Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).112
The disadvantage to the involvement of neighboring states is that
proximity sometimes can mean that the “neighbors” are not neutral and,
at worst, they can be involved in the conflict. This was the case in the
Congo in the 1990s following the removal of the Mobutu regime, where
a number of neighbors (Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Angola)
intervened militarily in the conflict and became part of the problem.113
On many occasions, one of the Security Council permanent
members—or another member state—will take the lead in designing and
drafting a particular PKO mandate.114 The sponsoring member state
writes the first draft of the mandate, which is subsequently circulated to
the Security Council.115 This tends to happen in cases where the
member state has a strong interest in ensuring that the PKO successfully
solves the conflict. For example, the United States took the lead in
drafting the mandates for both UNMIH (Haiti) and UNITAF (Somalia),
France took the lead in drafting UNOCI’s (Cote D’Ivoire) mandate,
France and the U.S. together took the lead in drafting Lebanon’s
UNIFIL, and the EU and other European states together took the lead in
drafting UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina).116
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. United Nations Transitional Group (UNTAG) was established in 1978 with a mandate of
assisting the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of
Namibia through free and fair elections under the UN. See S.C. Res. 435, U.N. Doc. S/RES/435
(Sept. 29, 1978). For a detailed discussion of the role of the Frontline States in the settlement of the
Namibian problem, see GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA, ALLIES IN ADVERSITY: THE FRONTLINE STATES
IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY, 1975-1993 (1994).
113. WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE, REPORT: U.S. ARMS TO AFRICA AND THE CONGO WARWORLD POLICY INSTITUTE-RESEARCH PROJECT (2000), http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/
arms/reports/Congo.htm.
114. See Nigeria and France Introduce UN Resolution Calling for Sanctions Against Ivory Coast’s
Gbagbo, Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
5869:france-and-nigeria-introduce-un-resolution-calling-for-sanctions-against-ivory-coasts-gbagbo&
catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=67; and Louis Charbonneau & Patrick Worsnip, France Asks UN Security
Council to Sanction Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo, Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/25/
us-ivorycoast-france-un-idUSTRE72O6KR20110325.
115. See Nigeria and France Introduce UN Resolution Calling for Sanctions Against Ivory
Coast’s Gbagbo, supra note 114; and Charbonneau & Worsnip, France Asks UN Security Council
to Sanction Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo, supra note 114.
116. The military operation that went to Haiti on September 1994 was led by the United States.
This later led to the establishment of UNMIH by Security Council Resolution 867, adopted on
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After the sponsor nation finalizes the drafting of the mandate (in the
form of a Security Council resolution draft), informal consultations
begin. There is no official record of this process. During this meeting,
the Security Council reviews the draft as well as the full SecretaryGeneral report and the peace agreement (if there is one) and decides
what sections to include in the mandate. Once the Security Council has
extensively reviewed the mandate, formal consultations begin. At this
point, the Security Council member states publicly explain their decision
to either support, abstain, or veto the Security Council resolution.117
There a is a strong view that the Security Council should involve troopcontributing countries in the consultation process regarding the
establishment or renewal of the mandate of a PKO in a more meaningful
manner and from the outset of the mandate’s elaboration.118
A.

Modification of Mandates

Mandates frequently change or are supplemented. A peacekeeping
mission may find that its mandate is deficient at the time of initial
deployment or that the mandate does not address issues that have
emerged since deployment. It is always a challenge to assess—prior to

September
23,
1993.
See
UN
Haiti
Background,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pastunmihbackgr2.html. The initial UN intervention
in Somalia, UNITAF, was a force organized and led by the United States. The intervention was by
Security Council Resolution 733, adopted on January 23, 1992, authorized to use all necessary
measures to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. See
United
Nations
Operation
in
Somalia
II,
http://www.un.org/DEpts/DPKO/Missions/UNOSOM2b.htm. The United Nations operation in
Cote D’Ivoire, UNOCI, created by Security Council Resolution 1528, adopted on February 27,
2004, was to support the implementation of the 2003 ceasefire Lina-Marcoussis Peace Agreement
brokered by France.
See United Nations Peacekeeping Better World Campaign,
http//www.betterworldcampaign.org./un-peacekeeping/missions/Cote-d’Ivoire.html. The United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was originally established by Resolution 425 and 426, adopted on
March 19, 1978. Following the July/August conflict, Resolution 1701 was adopted on August 11,
2006, calling for a halt in fighting in Lebanon and the deployment of Lebanese and United Nations
Forces in Southern Lebanon. This resolution was drafted by France and the United States. See
Warren Hoge, Resolution to Halt Fighting in Lebanon Is Unanimously Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 2006. The European Union played a major role in the establishment of UNPROFOR.
Resolution 914, adopted on April 27, 1994, was introduced in the Security Council by European
states. See THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PART I: GENERAL ISSUES 65 (Daniel
Bethlehem & Marc Weller eds., 1997).
117. For a comprehensive coverage of the Security Council’s debate regarding UNPROFOR’s
mandate, see THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PART I: GENERAL ISSUES (Daniel
Bethlehem & Marc Weller eds., 1997).
118. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly,
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶
17, U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000).
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deployment—how the mandate will work and how warring factions,
troops, and civil society will react to the mission. It is thus natural that
once the PKO is deployed in the field, its mandate should be revised to
reflect local needs. In fact, the most successful missions are those that
are flexible and easily adaptable to the needs on the ground.119 This
flexibility is particularly important to ensure that the mandate and
mission remain relevant to the conditions prevailing in the conflict state.
In South Africa, for example, Resolution 772—which did not include an
electoral component—was supplemented by Resolution 894 to respond
to the request of the Transitional Executive Council that the UN provide
a sufficient number of international observers to monitor the electoral
process and to coordinate the activities of the international observers
provided by the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, and
the European Union as well as by governments.120
There are several reasons why PKO mandates change. First, some
missions do not get feedback from the ground until the PKO is
deployed—due to, for example, lack of access to the country because of
fighting or hostility from the warring factions. Thus, it is not until they
are in the host country that PKO officials can fully grasp what is
occurring locally. Frequently, changes are simply due to the fact that a
specific task within the mandate is fulfilled and thus replaced by an
updated one. As an example, once disarmament has occurred, a PKO
may be required to aid in the reintegration of the ex-combatants into
society. Furthermore, PKOs do not receive all the necessary resources
for full implementation and therefore must constantly change their
strategies depending on how many troops and the level of financial
support received. In fact, many PKOs find that their donors and initial
supporters lack the political will initially promised, which in turn leads
to false expectations. Finally, regardless of such shortcomings, conflicts
are characteristically unpredictable, requiring constant adaptation.
As rightly observed in an UN report, when changes are made to
existing mandates, commensurate changes should be made to the
resources available to the PKO to carry out its new mandate.121 Changes
should be based on a thorough assessment of the situation after full

119. U.N. Ass’n in Can., Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Lessons from the Past, Building for
the Future 60 (2007).
120. S.C. Res. 894, U.N. Doc S/RES/894 (Jan. 14, 1994).
121. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly,
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶
55, U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000).
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consultation with the Security Council and troop-contributing states.122
Revisions to a mandate may be implemented by the Security Council
passing a new resolution that formally modifies or adds to the PKO
mandate. For example, the mission initially dispatched to BosniaHerzegovina was not meant to end any war, but rather to deliver
humanitarian aid.123 As Kofi Annan explained, the “nature of the
conflict, including ‘ethnic cleansing’ and concentration camps, seemed
to call for something more ambitious.”124 UNPROFOR soon found itself
containing the conflict with measures such as an arms embargo and a nofly zone to promote a ceasefire. However, this change, and many other
changes in mandates, did not occur with widespread agreement. In fact,
on May 30, 1994, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued for a
revision of the UNPROFOR mandate “so that it would include only
those tasks that a PKO could be reasonably expected to perform in the
circumstances prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”125
A shift that has occurred on several occasions with PKOs is moving
from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII mandate.126 This occurred in the UN
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999-2005) and in the UN
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC, 2000-present) due to a deteriorating security situation on the
ground.127 The new mandates authorize the PKO to take “the necessary
action” to ensure freedom of movement and protection of civilians.128
Other shifts require the creation of an entirely new PKO the necessary
change is so drastic that modifying an already existing mandate may not

122. Id.
123. See Andrzej Sitkowski, Reflections on the Peacekeeping Doctrine, in 7 INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING: THE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS 185 (Michael Bothe &
Boris Kondoch eds., 2002).
124. Kofi Annan, Peacekeeping, Military Intervention, and National Sovereignty in Internal
Armed Conflict, in HARD CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 63
(Jonathan Moore ed., 1999).
125. See Andrzej Sitkowski, Reflections on the Peacekeeping Doctrine, in 7 INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING: THE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS, supra note 123, at 181.
126. Boutros-Ghali warned against this shift in the 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace;
the 2000 Brahimi Report did the same, arguing instead to go in stronger and then draw down, rather
than the other way around. Missions established post-2000 have accordingly had bigger authorized
strengths, more “robust mandates” (especially with respect to protection of civilians—which greater
highlighting in the article), less restrictive ROEs, and greater force capabilities (e.g., attack
helicopters in MONUC).
127. See S.C. Res. 1291, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1291 (Feb. 24, 2000); S.C. Res. 1270, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999).
128. See generally Jane Boulden, United Nations Security Council Policy on Africa, in
DEALING WITH CONFLICT IN AFRICA: THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 11
(Jane Boulden ed., 2003).
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be enough. This occurred in Somalia between 1992-1995 in the
transition from UNOSOM I to UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Somalia
experienced a mixture of peacekeeping, peace making, peace
enforcement, and nation-building.129 UNOSOM I began as a mission to
support humanitarian relief, but was soon overwhelmed by the Somali
warlords.130 Even with a Chapter VII mandate, the PKO lacked the
force of arms and thus had to transition into a full-fledged military
operation that did not resolve the Somali crisis.131 The UN does not
presently have a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. It has authorized an
African Union Mission (AMISOM).132 Unfortunately, the Somalia crisis
continues as a Humans Right Watch report observes: “Somalia is nation
in ruins, mired in one of the world’s most brutal armed conflicts of
recent years.”133
IV. CONDITIONS AND FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE SUCCESS OF A
PEACEKEEPING MISSION
This section identifies critical factors that impact on the success of
a mission. Most of the conflicts are characterized by the combination of
internal and international factors in the conflict with serious human
rights violations and large scale suffering among the threatened civilian
population, which inevitably results in large numbers of refugees and
displaced persons. Very often, conflict is a symptom of an intrastate
crisis that is deeply rooted in the following conditions: authoritarian
rule; exclusion of minorities from governance; socio-economic
deprivation; and weak state structures that lack the capacity to handle
normal political and social conflict.134 Against this background—and
cognizant that generalizations can be dangerous—a number of factors
seem to determine the success of an intervention: cooperation of the
parties implementing the mandate; continuing support of the Security
Council; readiness of the states to provide financial, technical, and
materials resources to the mission; the need to deal with both past and

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See MURPHY, supra note 89, at 48.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
S.C. Res. 1964, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1964 (Dec. 22, 2010).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, REPORT: SO MUCH TO FEAR: WAR CRIMES AND THE
DEVASTATION OF SOMALIA 1 (2008).
134. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace
and Sustainable Development in Africa: , Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/52/871S/1998/318 (Apr. 13, 1998).
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current human rights violations; the need to deal with gender issues; and
leadership of the mission. Each of these issues warrants discussion.
A good mandate should be clear and practical and be backed by
secure funding. In order to structure a clear mandate there must be a
clear understanding of the nature of the problem and the underlying
cause. The strategic implication of this is that in structuring mandates
and UN missions, we must focus on the structural causes of conflict in
order to build a solid foundation for peace and ensure a future free of
conflicts. For example, in the case of Liberia, poverty, authoritarian
rule, and the old conflict between Americo-Liberians and indigenous
Liberians documented by J. Gus Liebenow in his 1969 book Liberia:
The Evolution of Privilege, has contributed significantly to the crises
Liberia has experienced.135 In Afghanistan, poverty, authoritarian rule
by the warlords and the Taliban, and denial of basic human rights are
major factors that contributed to the ignition of the crisis situation that
continues today. In present-day Darfur, religious tensions and the
attempt by the Arab population to ethnically cleanse the North of the
black Sudanese population are significant factors in the conflict. Such
crisis situations underscore that political stability requires structural
accommodation of diversity. In other words, for the purpose of devising
UN mandates and missions, it is necessary to distinguish between the
symptoms and causes of intrastate crises. Peacekeeping efforts which
treat the symptoms rather than sources of conflict lack a built-in exit
strategy and often lead to failure. The Somali crisis is often given as an
example of this phenomenon.
Unfortunately, the resources and energies of the international
community tend to be mobilized around the symptoms—rather than the
causes—of conflicts. As a result, traditional peacekeepers have
remained in place for several decades, such as in Cyprus and the
India/Pakistan border. It must also be taken into account that
peacekeeping increasingly involves internal wars with armed elements
only partially under the control of those who consent to a UN
deployment. In these cases, it might be necessary to first stabilize the
situation before a PKO can be deployed, as was the case in Liberia and
Sierra Leone.
In some contemporary post-conflict situations,
peacekeeping forces may need the ability to use force, if necessary, to
keep the initiative of the peace process on track and to defend the
peacekeeping mission and its mandate. A clear mandate must address
the need to use force in such circumstances. The Eastern Congo is an
135. See generally J. GUS LIEBENOW, LIBERIA: THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVILEGE (1969).
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example of a situation where the use of force was necessary to confront
the militias terrorizing the civilian population.
The mandate must be guided by the understanding that peace
making and peacebuilding are primarily the responsibility of local rather
than foreign actors. Although it may seem counterintuitive, the UN
PKOs may be more effective when the UN is not intricately involved in
the peace negotiations at the outset of the talks. In Cambodia in the
1990s, the contours of the mission were sketched out at an array of
informal meetings that allowed all the relevant regional actors to make
their preferences known.136 As a result, even though the interests of
Vietnam and China were diametrically opposed throughout the
negotiations process, the UN mandate was able to avoid association with
the dispute and to assume some semblance of impartiality. Similarly, in
the South African peace process, local stakeholders negotiated a
settlement and the UN helped implement it through monitoring the peace
accord structures and supporting the elections process in 1994.137 Such
successful examples highlight that the peace process must seek ways of
involving the local people in all aspects of its operations to the fullest
extent. It must also seek to involve regional actors.
Involvement of regional actors is important and holds relatively
untapped potential for the UN. The current missions in Sudan and
Somalia are examples of a growing collaboration between the UN and
the Africa Union. Regional actors can help players reach solutions
compatible with local traditions and can act as guarantors to the peace
process. Clearly, such interactions will require a greater amount of trust
on the parts of both the UN and regional actors. Regional actors are
sometimes skeptical of the UN’ intentions. On the other hand, the UN
has experienced difficulties in relation to capacities on the part of
regional actors, and even regional organizations face problems of
capacity.138 The AU Mission in Darfur which preceded the current

136. The United Nations Mission implemented the Paris Agreements concluded by Cambodian
parties. Under the agreements all parties agreed to end international involvement in the Cambodia
conflict, transform the military conflict into a political one and entrusted the holding of elections to
the United Nations. See David Ashley, Between War & Peace: Cambodia 1991-1998, Nov. 1998,
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/between-war-peace.php.
137. See Muna Ndulo, United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa: Preventive
Diplomacy and Peacekeeping, in 3 AFR. YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 222-23 (1995).
138. Mark Malan, Debunking Some Myths About Peacekeeping in Africa, in FROM
PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES: PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA, supra note 30.
Malan observes that: “the political frameworks for conflict management in the various African sub
regions are still in elementary stages of development.” Id. at 21.
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UN/AU mission, for example, was financed almost entirely by the
European Union and the UN.139 Until western states came to the AU’s
aid, the AU faced considerable difficulties in meeting the needs of the
mission in Sudan as African armies lacked essential equipment such as
helicopters and logistics equipment.
Nonetheless, a key advantage to involving regional actors is that
neighbors are more familiar than outsiders are with each other’s
problems. The disadvantage is that close proximity reduces impartiality
and heightens the risk of involvement.140 There is also the problem of
differences over applicable values. A recent example is the sharp
differences in the views held by the UN and the African Union over the
indictment of Bashir by the International Criminal Court. To maximize
the benefits, cooperation between the UN and regional organizations
must be based on strict observance of the principles and ideals of the UN
Charter.
In developing a mandate, as a political body, the Security Council
focuses on consensus building, even though it can make decisions with
less than unanimity. But very often, the compromise required to build
consensus can be made at the expense of specificity, and the resulting
ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the mandate is
then subject to varying interpretations. The worst example of the
consequences of an inadequate mandate is the Rwanda Genocide. There
was a lack of clarity as to whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement
was needed. There is general agreement that had action been taken in
Rwanda, the genocide could very well have been averted. Because an
inadequate mandate could lead to the UN itself exacerbating a problem,
it is crucial that peacekeeping missions are given robust mandates.
It is important to emphasize that, in circumstances where a party to
a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms,
continued equal treatment of all parties by the UN can, in the best case,
result in ineffectiveness—and in the worst may amount to complicity
with evil. The UN is not a neutral actor and should not be; it is an
organization guided by the core values of the UN Charter. Impartiality
does not mean neutrality. Neutrality in the face of violations of the UN
Charter norms only rewards the transgressors. No failure did more to
damage the standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s
139. Id. See also Addis Ababa, EU to Finance over Half of African Union Peace Mission Cost
in Darfur, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 2004, http://www.Sudantribune.com/spip.php?ifrmed.page+
imprimable&id_article=6120.
140. For example, as previously noted, the Congo war drew in neighboring Angola, Namibia,
Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda.
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than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor in such missions
as the Congo in the 1960s.
At a practical level, once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able
to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully. This means
that UN military units must be capable of defending themselves, other
mission components, and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement
should be sufficiently robust and not force UN contingents to cede the
initiative to their attackers. UN peacekeepers have often come under
attack for failing to protect civilians.141 In the Sudan, for example, there
are complaints that UNAMID is failing to protect civilians.142 The
problem appears to be that UN forces often seek Sudanese authorization
to move around the country and do not move unless they are given
clearance by the host government. Further, the UN takes the view that
the primary responsibility to protect civilians lies with the countries
concerned.143 This is an unrealistic approach that cannot advance the
objectives of the mandate and protect civilians. Once the UN has a
mandate and Status of Forces Agreement, the two documents should be
the only guiding documents.
Peacekeeping missions cannot succeed unless the warring parties
agree to cooperate in the implementation of the mandate. Force alone
cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace maybe
established. As a result, consent of the parties is the bedrock principle of
PKOs. The problem is that local parties sometimes sign peace accords
for a variety of reasons—not all of them favorable to peace—there are
often “spoiler-groups” who renege on their commitments or otherwise
seek to undermine a peace accord through violence. In both Sierra
Leone and Angola, the first PKOs did not produce lasting peace; in each
country, challenged peace implementation threw the nation back into
civil war.144

141. A United Nations official, Mr. A. Khare, Deputy Head of UN Peacekeeping Operations,
admitted that UNAMID had failed to prevent armed rebels from raping hundreds of women in
several Congo villages. See UN Says Peacekeepers ‘Failed’ DR Congo Rape Victims, BBC NEWS,
Sept. 7, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11224656.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See generally Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Peace Keeping Under ECOMOC: A Sub-regional
Approach, in FROM PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES: PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN
AFRICA, supra note 30. See also United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Background,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ missions/past/unamsil/background/html. See also Gwinyayi
Albert Dzinesa, A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia, 11 INT’L
PEACEKEEPING, no. 4, 2004, at 644-62.
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For peacekeeping to succeed in reducing tension and averting
conflict, the UN needs clear, unwavering, strong, and sustained political
support from the Security Council and member states.145 Lack of
support can result in delays or impediments to taking action, as well as a
lack of sufficient resources to effectively implement a course of action
once it has been decided upon.
A.

Readiness of Member States to Contribute Troops, Personnel, and
Adequate Financial and Logistical Support

The UN is totally dependent on the contributions of member states
for peacekeeping missions; the UN does not have a standing army or
police force.146 As is well known, the UN continues to experience a
troop commitment gap. Industrial states tend to prioritize deployment of
their troops to operations led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
states (NATO), the European Union and/or ad hoc coalitions authorized
by the Security Council. Developing countries continued to provide the
largest numbers of military and civilian police personnel for UN
PKOs.147
The commitment gap often translates into delays in
deployment. Examples of the effect of delays is in Liberia, where the
UN force was authorized in August 2003, but by March 2004 it still had
not achieved its full strength, delaying key programs such as the
disarmament of combatants.148
The speedy deployment of military, civil police, and civilian
experts will not help to solidify peace and establish the credibility of an
operation if these personnel are not equipped to do their job. To be
effective, the mission’s personnel need material, equipment, and
logistical support. The early days of the Sierra Leone mission provides a
very clear example of what could happen when men and women are
deployed without logistical support: lacking communications equipment
and weapons to defend themselves, 500 UN peacekeepers were captured
by rebel fighters in the early days of the Sierra Leone mission.149
Willingness by member states to contribute troops to a credible

145. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly,
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶
7, U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000).
146. Id. ¶ 84.
147. Id. ¶¶ 102-07.
148. U.N. Secretary-General, Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission in Liberia, U.N. Doc. S/2004/229 (Mar. 22, 2004).
149. U.N. Secretary-General, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone, ¶¶ 10-15, U.N. Doc. S/2000/186 (Mar. 7, 2000).
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operation also implies a willingness to accept the risk of casualties on
behalf of the mandate; nevertheless, it is hard for countries to accept this
reality.
The missions in Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, and East Timor
can be considered successful missions in terms of supporting multiparty
elections that resulted in the formation of broad-based representative
governments.
Although these missions operated in completely
dissimilar environments, they are a useful indicator of the conditions for
success. As previously discussed, these conditions can be roughly
divided into two categories: the nature of the mandates and the
resources available to each mission.
In terms of respective mandates, in Cambodia, Namibia, and
Mozambique, the warring parties had concluded a peace agreement and
welcomed UN involvement and deployment of a peacekeeping force.
Although it may seem obvious that a mission is more likely to succeed
when opponents have already agreed upon a solution, it is important to
note that this was not easily achieved at the outset in any of the three
cases and was the result of intensive negotiations. In Cambodia,
Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge each remained determined to vanquish
the other while their foreign suppliers were content to watch their
proxies fight. In Namibia, despite General Assembly and Security
Council Resolutions, South Africa remained convinced for many years
that a military victory over the guerrilla forces was possible.150 In
Mozambique, a brutal war ranged for several years between FRELIMO
and RENAMO as their backers remained prepared to fund the conflict.
In each of these cases, serious negotiations began only after it became
obvious to all parties involved in the conflict that a military stalemate
had resulted,151 thus lending serious weight to the idea that a critical
element for successful peacekeeping is the realization that outright
victory for either side is unlikely, and a sound peace agreement which
has the support of all the parties to the conflict is the best case scenario.
An additional “success” factor in Cambodia, Namibia, and
Mozambique was that the mandates of each mission and the respective
peace settlement was negotiated primarily by outsiders, lending further
credence to the view that UN PKOs are more likely to be effective when
the UN is not intricately involved in the minute details of negotiations at
the outset. In Mozambique, the Vatican mediated the peace negotiations
150. Leopold Scholtz, The Namibian Border War: An Appraisal of the South African Strategy,
34 S. AFR. J. OF MIL. STUD. 19 (2006).
151. Ann L. Phillips, Mozambique: A Chance for Peace, CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS
CASE STUDIES SERIES NO. 10 8 (2010).
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between FRELIMO and RANAMO, which led to a ceasefire and a peace
agreement that the UN went in to implement.152 And, as already pointed
out in the Cambodia case, the contours of the mission were sketched out
at an array of informal meetings that allowed all of the relevant regional
actors to make their preferences known.153 Likewise, in Namibia, the
regional actors, through a group called the Front Line States, negotiated
some of the terms of the peace settlement.154 These cases would suggest
that regional blocks in some situations may be better incubators of UN
mandates than the Security Council.
B.

Human Rights Violence—Current and Past

Conflict situations are characterized by lack of respect for the rule
of law, gross human rights violations, and impunity. In a post-conflict
society, some of the most difficult tasks include articulating a vision of a
new society, dealing with past human rights violations, defining the
fundamental principles by which the country will be transformed, and
engaging in effective reconciliation. The manner in which these
processes are handled can play an important role in the consolidation of
peace. A peacekeeping mission must have a component within the
peace process to develop mechanisms to address the development of a
comprehensive program for national reconciliation. Examples are the
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions that have been established in
various countries emerging from gross human rights violations.155
Indeed, there can be no lasting peace where a nation does not deal
with its past and its citizens continue to be traumatized. Each mission
should have a humanitarian component to deal with the often tragic
conditions that people in zones of conflict inhabit. Many thousands of
people are often driven from their homes in conflict zones. In fact, it is
estimated that there are now over 25 million internally displaced people
worldwide—outnumbering refugees by more than two to one.156 A
humanitarian component will ensure a more coherent and strategically
coordinated humanitarian response to the plight of internally displaced
people. Particular attention should be given to addressing the needs of
children.
152. Moise Vanacio, Mediation by the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique, 1988-1991, in
MEDIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 147 (Stephen Chan & Vivien Jabri eds., 1993).
153. See LIEBENOW, supra note 135.
154. See KHADIAGALA, supra note 112.
155. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL, HUMAN RIGHTS 743 (2009).
156. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL & GLOBAL IDP PROJECT, INTERNATIONALLY DISPLACED
PERSONS: A GLOBAL SURVEY (2002).
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Gender Component

Similarly, a good peacekeeping mission should have a gender unit
to ensure that gender equality in the mission, as well as the peace
process, is mainstreamed. Women have their own perspective and
experiences to bring to conflict resolution, particularly in light of the fact
that women are disproportionately impacted by conflict.157 After all,
what can be more democratic than to ensure that every voice is heard in
the political process? One way of ensuring that gender is a critical part
of the mission is to start with the mission itself. There should be
increased participation of women at all levels of the mission. As has
been observed—including through Security Council Resolution 1325—
mainstreaming gender into peacebuilding initiatives is critical to making
societies more equitable and just.158 The inclusion of women in
peacebuilding activities could help unshackle societies from patriarchy
and promote a transformative agenda. Such action must also facilitate
the addressing of unequal power relations and gender inequality.159 The
very first all-female peacekeeping force was deployed in Liberia in
2007.160 Since then, scores of women have helped to disengage armed
forces, protect civilians, and promote human rights. The UN SecretaryGeneral, Ban Ki-Moon, has spoken about the positive impact women
bring to peacekeeping, stating that “whether interviewing victims of
sexual violence, working in women’s prisons, assisting female excombatants reintegrating into civilian life, or mentoring female police
cadets, women personnel have a clear advantage. They can help
empower women to rebuild their war-torn countries and act as role
models.”161 Further, it has been noted that the presence of women
peacekeepers in Liberia is reducing the incidence of sexual
exploitation.162 For all of these reasons, a serious and robust gender
component should be prioritized as a central component to each

157. See Sherrill Whittington, Security and Reconstruction in Africa: Role of Security Council
Resolution 1325, Women, Peace and Security, in SECURITY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND
RECONCILIATION: WHEN THE WARS END, supra note 33, at 97.
158. Id.
159. GINYAYI A. DZINESA & ELIZABETH OTITODUN, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA: PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS (Adekeye
Adebajo & Mark Paterson eds., 2009).
160. United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
161. Ban Ki-moon, Remarks to Commission on the Status of Women High-Level Event
Marking International Women’s Day—“Equal Rights, Equal Opportunities and Progress for All,”
U.N.
NEWS
CENTRE,
Mar.
3,
2010,
http://un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/
statments_full.asp?statID=736.
162. Id.
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peacekeeping mission—and should not be relegated to an after-thought
or “soft issue.”
D.

Leadership of Mission

Effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a
cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse
circumstances and one that struggles to maintain those attributes. The
tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and
ability of those who lead it. The heads of UN peacekeeping missions are
unique in their ex officio ability to make or break a peace operation and
because they may significantly enhance an operation’s credibility and
effectiveness through measured judgment strength of character and on
the ground acuity.163 It is widely acknowledged that the success of the
Mozambique mission was due to the excellent leadership provided by
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Aldo Ajello.164 It is
important, therefore, that careful attention be given to choosing heads of
peacekeeping missions; proven leadership, judgment, and integrity are
among the core attributes that must be sought and demonstrated.
V. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES IN A PEACEKEEPING MISSION
In addition to the challenges discussed above, peacekeeping
missions encounter issues relating to security and disarmament of
combatants and their reintegration into society. Peacebuilding makes a
direct contribution to public security and law and order. But the basic
objective of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is not met
unless all three elements of the process are implemented. These are
always part of the major tasks that peacekeeping missions need to
address. As might be reasonably expected from the broad variety and
scope of peacekeeping missions, the results over these issues have been
mixed. A number of conditions are necessary for a successful
reconstruction, disarmament, and reintegration program. Reconstruction
is a critical objective for the long-term success of a mission. David
Keen makes the important point that when we talk about reconstruction

163. HEARNE, supra note 87, at 1.
164. Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg observed that “regional and extra-regional players
provided crucial diplomatic and financial support to the peace process and stopped arming
Mozambique’s warring factions; and the UN had an effective and energetic Special Representative
in the person of Aldo Ajello.” Adekeye Adebajo & Chris Landsberg, Back to the Future: UN
Peacekeeping in Africa, in MANAGING ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 163 (Adekey
Adebajo & Chandra Lekah Spiram eds., 2001).
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it should be clear that it is not about reconstructing the exact social and
economic conditions prevailing at the outset of a conflict that caused the
problem in the first place.165 Failure to tackle the underlying grievance
will be damaging in the long run. Byron Tarr illustrates this point when
he makes the argument that Liberia’s past efforts at reform are replete
with failure because they all fail to address the underlying problems of
marginalization of indigenous people, decentralization, and Liberia’s
inability to decide whether it remains “an outpost of Western
civilization” or is an African state desiring to be a responsible member
of an integrating subregion.166
Disarmament and demobilization of former combatants are key to
immediate post-conflict stability and reduce the likelihood of conflict
recurrence. Indeed, disarmament is the smallest part of the peace
process while reintegration is often a bigger problem. Whether
economic and political reconstruction can begin depends on how quickly
security spreads throughout the country. Typically, the main spoilers are
the politicians; the fighters are more committed to peace than their
political masters. Demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm)
will tend to return to a life of violence if they find no legitimate
livelihood—that is, if they are not “reintegrated” into the local economy.
In the end, economic development is critical to sustained demobilization
and the peace process. Reintegration is a long-term matter that must be
linked to jump starting the country’s economy and giving fighters hope
of better prospects. Money will be needed to assist in providing training,
skills, and vocational education. Jobs are an essential ingredient of an
effective reintegration strategy that will be critical for breaking the ties
of fighters to their political masters. The typical approach is to train exfighters in various trades such as bricklaying and carpentry. Without job
opportunities to utilize the trades taught, the training does not provide
real alternatives. An example of what can happen when there is no
meaningful reintegration is East Timor in 2006, where ex-combatants
rebelled and started fighting with the army.167 Patterns of development
that empower ordinary people through jobs and access to education and
improved security will weaken the position of warlords and extremist
165. David Keen, War and Peace: What’s the Difference, in MANAGING ARMED CONFLICT IN
note 164, at 14.
166. Byron Tarr, Reconstruct Governance to Rouse Liberia, Long Forlorn, in SECURITY,
RECONSTRUCTION, AND RECONCILIATION: WHEN THE WARS END 206 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2006).
167. Following the collapse of the East Timorese police force, the United Nations extended the
mandate of the 1440 international police and more than 1200 civilian staff and volunteers to remain
in the country for twelve months. See United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT)
Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ missions/unmit/background.shtml.
THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
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politicians who offer to meet these needs through violence and
harassment of the people.
A separate challenge that should be considered in peacekeeping
missions is that there is often too much focus on early elections in peace
processes. Elections are an important and necessary component of the
democratic process, and most peace agreements call for elections early
on in the process. However, to conduct an election is a logistically huge
undertaking. It requires security and capacity. Warlords have
demonstrated time and time again that they benefit most from a
premature rush to the ballot box and from the sham legitimacy that it
confers. It must be borne in mind that an election is a contest—and a
contest is necessarily combative. Elections therefore require clear rules
so that even the losers trust that the rules have been applied justly;
otherwise, former enemies will continue their rivalry and contest by
other means. In cases where elections are premature and poorly
organized, the heightened expectations surrounding the elections can
become a dangerous force. In such situations, elections do not guarantee
democracy; they, in fact, can make matters worse. In this regard, one
need only look at the Liberian elections in the 1990s that brought
Charles Taylor to power and legitimized his rule.168
An additional problem is too much focus on leaders rather than
ordinary people. UN peace processes are often built around leaders and
do not pay sufficient attention to the ordinary people. Typically, there is
no parallel peace process on the ground. The exception was South
Africa, where Peace Accord Structures were established through
legislation at national, regional, and local levels.169 The Structures,
comprised of inclusive committees representing stakeholders at local
community, district, and provincial levels, established and discussed the
peace process and reconstruction of infrastructure damaged in political
violence in the various communities. These forums played a critical role
in articulating the concerns of ordinary people and fed into the national
process.170 The local Structures enable communities to contribute to the
maintenance of a secure local environment for peacebuilding and enable
168. In Liberia, after the 1989 elections that brought Charles Taylor to power, the security
situation deteriorated. Conflicts escalated and thousands of civilians were killed. See United
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
unmil/background.shtml.
169. Final Rep. of the U.N. Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the U.N.
Secretary-General (May 26, 1994).
170. In a bid to stem political violence, in September 1991, political parties and other
stakeholders signed the National Peace Accord, in which all signatories pledged to promote peace
and stability throughout South Africa.
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the peacebuilder’s task of supporting the political, social, and economic
changes that create a secure, self-sustaining environment. After all, the
goal of international intervention should always be seen first and
foremost as facilitating local processes, providing resources, and
creating the local actors to resolve their own problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has offered some suggestions on how peacekeeping
missions can be made more effective. The success of a mission will
depend largely on whether there is a clear and responsive peacekeeping
mandate and whether the mandate is supported by adequate resources
and effective leadership. Mandates are texts that are open to a certain
degree of interpretation. In that respect, peacekeeping missions must be
prepared to adapt mandates to local conditions and missions must show
flexibility. At the same time, mandates must be interpreted in a more
expansive manner. Since it is usually up to the Force Commander and
the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to direct the
implementation of the mandate, they may do so by going beyond the
initial narrowly defined objective of the mandate when the
circumstances demand such departure. They should be informed by
conditions on the ground. In that respect, the peacekeepers must view
the mandate as a floor rather than a ceiling. This can be a helpful start
for the adaptation of the mandate to the needs of the conditions on the
ground and more effective peacekeeping.
Among the lessons we have learned over time—including from the
Liberian situation in 1990, Haiti in 1994, and East Timor in 2006—is
that the world must not pull out from post conflict states too early.
Consolidating peace and putting a country on the path to development
requires sustained multi-year support.
It requires promoting
development agendas that seek to transform the society and conditions
that played midwife to the conflict. Development agendas should put
education, employment, and participation in governance at the heart of
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. The temptation
among donors to favor immediate results and short time planning
horizons in dictating their commitments, do not lend themselves to the
kind of slow and sustained support required for post-conflict
peacebuilding. The international community has to remain engaged long
after the peace process is solved—otherwise, history repeats itself.
Special attention must be paid to developing institutions of governance
and public administration, a process which is, of course, complex. First,
governance is a concept that is wider than, but includes, public
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administration. Taking this into account, there is a need to guard against
considering only institutions of government; the discussion must include
institutions that facilitate collaboration, involvement, consultation, and
participation of all stakeholders in all sectors (public sector, private
sector, and civil society) in the act of governance. The UN has
recognized this and important steps have been taken within the UN to
establish structures to address some of these issues. For example, this
article mentioned the Peacebuilding Commission initiative, and there are
others such as the establishment of a mediation support unit followed by
a team of mediators to provide technical expertise and support for highlevel UN and regional mediators. In addition, the UN has established
regional offices in West Africa and Central Asia to support UN peace
initiatives.
Peacekeeping initiatives offer unique and extraordinary promise in
bringing about and consolidating peace in the most dire of
circumstances. Given the enormity of the stakes, it behooves the
international community to assess past peacekeeping experiences and
draw from lessons learned. Only with serious investment, planning,
inclusion, and leadership can the promise of peacekeeping be realized—
and it is an objective well worth striving to reach.
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